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Enforcing Forum-Selection Clauses
Bradley Scott Shannon*
In Atlantic Marine Construction Co. v. U.S. District Court, the Supreme Court created
a scheme for the enforcement of contractual forum-selection clauses in federal courts.
But the Court’s scheme, which relies heavily on the use of federal venue transfer
statutes and the doctrine of forum non conveniens, is highly problematic. The relevance
of federal venue statutes for this purpose seems questionable, and the use of such
statutes results in an unduly complicated analysis that fails to capture all relevant
considerations in this context. The Court’s reliance on federal venue statutes also
prevents state courts faced with similar issues from utilizing the same mode of analysis.
Simply enforcing forum-selection clauses by their terms through a motion to dismiss
would result in a simpler, more just, and more universal solution to this problem.

* Professor of Law, Florida Coastal School of Law. I thank the organizers of this Symposium,
particularly Professors Scott Dodson and Stephen Sachs, for graciously inviting me to participate; the
University of California Hastings College of the Law, particularly Professors Mary Kay Kane and
Richard Marcus, for hosting this Symposium and for serving as moderators; and the Board of Editors
of the Hastings Law Journal, particularly Emily Goldberg Knox, Kyla Kessler Rowe, and Rob Taboada
for their hard work and hospitality.
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Introduction
The Supreme Court’s recent decision in Atlantic Marine
Construction Co. v. U.S. District Court1 raises a number of interesting
and important questions, many of which this Symposium addresses. This
Article, though, will confine itself to the question specifically before the
Court in that case: how should a contractual forum-selection clause2 be
enforced when one of the parties commences an action in a different
court?3 Though seemingly mundane, this question is important,4 and yet it
has somehow defied a simple solution.
The Supreme Court, of course, has already answered this question,
at least as it was presented in Atlantic Marine: When venue in a federal
district court, ignoring the existence of any forum-selection clause, is
proper under the applicable federal venue statute, a forum-selection
clause generally may be enforced by a motion to transfer venue under 28
U.S.C. § 1404(a),5 albeit with modifications to the analysis used to
transfer venue in the absence of such a clause.6 But as a normative

1. 134 S. Ct. 568 (2013).
2. Generally speaking, a “forum-selection clause” is a “contractual provision in which the parties
establish the place (such as the country, state, or type of court) for specified litigation between them.”
Black’s Law Dictionary 770 (10th ed. 2014). Such clauses (or agreements) can take a variety of
forms. See, e.g., Kevin M. Clermont, Governing Law on Forum-Selection Agreements, 66 Hastings
L.J. 643, 645–49 (2015) (discussing various types of forum-selection agreements).
3. See Atl. Marine, 134 S. Ct. at 575 (“The question in this case concerns the procedure that is
available for a defendant in a civil case who seeks to enforce a forum-selection clause.”).
4. See 14D Charles Alan Wright et al., Federal Practice and Procedure § 3803.1 (3d ed.
2007) (“Contractual provisions undertaking to provide where a suit may be brought in disputes arising
out of the agreement are not uncommon. These provisions first were seen in shipping and other
international commercial transactions, but now appear in contracts of every description and, if
anything, are being used with greater frequency.”).
5. See 28 U.S.C. § 1404(a) (2012) (“For the convenience of parties and witnesses, in the interest of
justice, a district court may transfer any civil action to any other district or division where it might have
been brought or to any district or division to which all parties have consented.”).
6. See Atl. Marine, 134 S. Ct. at 575. In dicta, the Court strongly implied that when venue is
improper, such a clause may be enforced by a motion to dismiss (or possibly transfer) under 28 U.S.C.
§ 1406 and/or Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(3). See id. at 577. The Court further opined that
when such a clause points to a state or even a foreign forum, it may be enforced by a motion to dismiss
for forum non conveniens. See id. at 580.
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matter, is the scheme created by the Atlantic Marine Court the best
approach?
No. This Article will argue that motions to transfer venue under
28 U.S.C. § 1404, motions to dismiss or transfer for improper venue
under 28 U.S.C. § 14067 and/or Federal Rule of Civil Procedure
12(b)(3),8 motions to dismiss under the doctrine of forum non
conveniens,9 and (as was argued by Professor Stephen E. Sachs as
amicus) motions to dismiss for failure to state a claim upon which relief
can be granted under Rule 12(b)(6)10 are not the best—or even
appropriate—vehicles for enforcing a forum-selection clause. Rather, a
forum-selection clause should be enforced simply by a motion to dismiss
under the parties’ contract—that is, for enforcement of the forumselection clause itself.
The remainder of this Article consists of three main parts. Part I
briefly summarizes the Supreme Court’s decision in Atlantic Marine and
the various arguments made therein. Part II criticizes the approach taken
by the Court as well as that proposed by the amicus. Finally, Part III
presents an alternative approach—a motion to dismiss for enforcement
of the forum-selection clause—and seeks to show that this approach is
normatively superior.

I. The Supreme Court’s Decision in ATLANTIC MARINE
In Atlantic Marine, the parties—J-Crew Management, Inc., a Texas
corporation and Atlantic Marine Construction Co., Inc., a Virginia
corporation—entered into a contract for work on a construction project
in Texas.11 The contract provided, inter alia, that any action between the
7. See 28 U.S.C. § 1406(a).
8. See Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(3). Incidentally, in this Article, “Rule” or “Rules” refers to the
Federal Rules of Civil Procedure.
9. See Black’s Law Dictionary 770 (10th ed. 2014) (defining “forum non conveniens” as “[t]he
doctrine that an appropriate forum—even though competent under the law—may divest itself of
jurisdiction if, for the convenience of the litigants and the witnesses, it appears that the action should
proceed in another forum in which the action might also have been properly brought in the first
place”). See also Sinochem Int’l Co. v. Malay. Int’l Shipping Corp., 549 U.S. 422, 429–30 (2007)
(discussing this doctrine generally).
10. See Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(6). Though the Atlantic Marine Court characterized Professor
Sachs’ argument in terms of Rule 12(b)(6), see infra text accompanying notes 27–29, his argument in
fact referred to Rules 12(c) and 56 as well as 12(b)(6). See Brief of Professor Stephen E. Sachs as
Amicus Curiae in Support of Neither Party at 12–27, Atl. Marine, 134 S. Ct. 568 (No. 12-929)
[hereinafter “Sachs Brief”]. Though motions to dismiss for failure to state a claim, for judgment on the
pleadings, see Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(c)), for summary judgment, see Fed. R. Civ. P. 56, as well as motions
for judgment as a matter of law, see Fed. R. Civ. P. 50, represent different ways of contesting (or
perhaps enforcing) claims and certain defenses, they are related in that the standard for each is
essentially the same. See, e.g., Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 251–52 (1986) (equating
the standard for summary judgment with that of judgment as a matter of law). Accordingly, this
Article will use “Rule 12(b)(6)” to refer to all such motions.
11. Atl. Marine, 134 S. Ct. at 575.
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parties relating to the contract “shall be litigated in the Circuit Court for the
City of Norfolk, Virginia, or in the United States District Court for the
Eastern District of Virginia, Norfolk Division.”12 Nonetheless, following
a dispute regarding payment, J-Crew—in apparent contravention of the
parties’ forum-selection clause—commenced an action against Atlantic
Marine in the U.S. District Court for the Western District of Texas.13 In
response, Atlantic Marine moved to dismiss the action for improper
venue under 28 U.S.C. § 1406(a)14 and/or Rule 12(b)(3),15 or,
alternatively, to transfer the action to the venue specified in the parties’
contract (the Eastern District of Virginia) under 28 U.S.C. § 1404(a).16
Because venue, without regard to the forum-selection clause, was
proper in the Western District of Texas under the applicable venue
statute, 28 U.S.C. § 1391(b),17 the Supreme Court unanimously held that the
proper procedure for enforcing the forum-selection clause where a federal
forum is available is a motion to transfer venue pursuant to § 1404(a).18
But the Court strongly implied that if venue had been improper in the
district where the action was commenced (again, without regard to the
forum-selection clause), such a clause could be enforced by a motion to
dismiss or possibly transfer venue under § 1406(a) and/or Rule
12(b)(3).19 The Court further opined that when a forum-selection clause

12. Id.
13. Id. at 576.
14. See 28 U.S.C. § 1406(a) (2012) (“The district court of a district in which is filed a case laying
venue in the wrong division or district shall dismiss, or if it be in the interest of justice, transfer such
case to any district or division in which it could have been brought.”).
15. Rule 12(b)(3) provides for the assertion, by preanswer motion, of the defense of improper
venue. See Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(3).
16. Atl. Marine, 134 S. Ct. at 576. See § 1404(a).
17. Section 1391(b) (“Venue in General”) provides:
A civil action may be brought in—
(1) a judicial district in which any defendant resides, if all defendants are residents of the
State in which the district is located;
(2) a judicial district in which a substantial part of the events or omissions giving rise to the
claim occurred, or a substantial part of property that is the subject of the action is situated; or
(3) if there is no district in which an action may otherwise be brought as provided in this
section, any judicial district in which any defendant is subject to the court’s personal
jurisdiction with respect to such action.
28 U.S.C. § 1391(b). The Supreme Court concluded that venue in the Western District of Texas was
proper because this was a judicial district in which a substantial part of the events or omissions giving
rise to the plaintiff’s claims occurred. See Atl. Marine, 134 S. Ct. at 576 n.1 (“Venue was otherwise
proper in the Western District of Texas because the subcontract at issue in the suit was entered into
and was to be performed in that district.”).
18. Atl. Marine, 134 S. Ct. at 575.
19. Id. at 577 (“Section 1406(a) and Rule 12(b)(3) allow dismissal only when venue is ‘wrong’ or
‘improper.’”).
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points to a state or foreign court, it may be enforced by a motion to
dismiss under the doctrine of forum non conveniens.20
Although the Court found that § 1404(a) was “the appropriate
provision to enforce the forum-selection clause in this case,” it added that
certain analytical “adjustments” are required when the transfer motion is
“premised” on such a clause:21
First, the plaintiff’s choice of forum merits no weight. Rather, as the
party defying the forum-selection clause, the plaintiff bears the burden
of establishing that transfer to the forum for which the parties
bargained is unwarranted. . . .
Second, a court evaluating a defendant’s § 1404(a) motion to
transfer based on a forum-selection clause should not consider
arguments about the parties’ private interests. . . .22
As a consequence, a district court may consider arguments about
public-interest factors only. . . .23
Third, when a party bound by a forum-selection clause flouts its
contractual obligation and files suit in a different forum, a § 1404(a)
transfer of venue will not carry with it the original venue’s choice-oflaw rules—a factor that in some circumstances may affect publicinterest considerations.24

The Court repeatedly indicated that “[w]hen the parties have agreed to a
valid forum-selection clause, a district court should ordinarily transfer
the case to the forum specified in that clause.”25 But under certain

20. Id. at 580 (“[T]he appropriate way to enforce a forum-selection clause pointing to a state or
foreign forum is through the doctrine of forum non conveniens.”).
21. Id. at 581.
22. Id. at 582. Under a more typical § 1404(a) analysis, such private interests include,
“relative ease of access to sources of proof; availability of compulsory process for
attendance of unwilling, and the cost of obtaining attendance of willing, witnesses;
possibility of view of premises, if view would be appropriate to the action; and all other
practical problems that make trial of a case easy, expeditious and inexpensive.”

Id. at 581 n.6 (quoting Piper Aircraft Co. v. Reyno, 454 U.S. 235, 241 n.6 (1981)). See also id. at 582
(“When parties agree to a forum-selection clause, they waive the right to challenge the preselected forum as
inconvenient or less convenient for themselves or their witnesses, or for their pursuit of the litigation.”).
23. Id. at 582. “Public-interest factors may include ‘the administrative difficulties flowing from
court congestion; the local interest in having localized controversies decided at home; [and] the
interest of having the trial of a diversity case in a forum that is at home with the law.’” Id. at 581 n.6
(quoting Piper, 454 U.S. at 241 n.6).
24. Id. at 582.
25. Id. at 581. See also id. (observing that a “valid” forum-selection clause “represents the parties’
agreement as to the most proper forum” (quoting Stewart Organization, Inc. v. Ricoh Corp., 487 U.S.
22, 31 (1988)), and that the enforcement of such a clause, “bargained for by the parties, protects their
legitimate expectations and furthers vital interests of the justice system” (quoting Stewart, 487 U.S. at
33 (Kennedy, J., concurring))); id. at 583 (“When parties have contracted in advance to litigate
disputes in a particular forum, courts should not unnecessarily disrupt the parties’ settled expectations.
A forum-selection clause, after all, may have figured centrally in the parties’ negotiations and may
have affected how they set monetary and other contractual terms; it may, in fact, have been a critical
factor in their agreement to do business in the first place.”).
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circumstances, which the Court termed “extraordinary,” a motion to
transfer venue in this context properly may be denied.26
Professor Sachs, as amicus, argued that a forum-selection clause
should not be enforced by a motion to transfer or dismiss under § 1404,
§ 1406, or Rule 12(b)(3), but rather by a motion to dismiss under Rule
12(b)(6).27 But because Atlantic Marine “did not file a motion under Rule
12(b)(6), and the parties did not brief the Rule’s application to this case
at any stage in this litigation,” the Court declined to consider it.28 The Court
added, though, that “[e]ven if a defendant could use Rule 12(b)(6) to
enforce a forum-selection clause, that would not change [its] conclusions
that § 1406(a) and Rule 12(b)(3) are not proper mechanisms to enforce a
forum-selection clause and that § 1404(a) and the forum non conveniens
doctrine provide appropriate enforcement mechanisms” in this case.29

II. A Critique of the Approaches Taken by the
Supreme Court and Argued by the Amicus
As is true of most cases, the Atlantic Marine Court might have been
somewhat constrained by the manner in which the enforcement of the
forum-selection clause was asserted and argued by the parties. Moreover,
both the Court and the parties might have been constrained to some
extent by Supreme Court precedent.30 Regardless, there appear to be
several problems with the approach taken by the Court in this case,
problems that raise concerns about its propriety.31 And most of these

26. Id. at 581. See also id. at 583 (“In all but the most unusual cases . . . ‘the interest of justice’ is
served by holding parties to their bargain.”).
27. See id. at 580.
28. Id.
29. Id. at 581; id. at 580 n.4 (“We observe, moreover, that a motion under Rule 12(b)(6), unlike a
motion under § 1404(a) or the forum non conveniens doctrine, may lead to a jury trial on venue if
issues of material fact relating to the validity of the forum-selection clause arise. Even if Professor
Sachs is ultimately correct, therefore, defendants would have sensible reasons to invoke § 1404(a) or
the forum non conveniens doctrine in addition to Rule 12(b)(6).”).
30. In particular, the Court seemed to be heavily influenced by its earlier decision in Stewart, a case
in which the parties took essentially the same approach to the enforcement of a forum-selection clause as
was taken by the parties in Atlantic Marine. Id. at 578 (“Our holding also finds support in Stewart . . . .”).
31. To be clear (and to narrow the areas of disagreement), this Article does not take issue with
the Court’s conclusion that venue was proper in the district in which the action was commenced for
purposes of 28 U.S.C. § 1404—a conclusion that seems correct in any event—because (as will be
argued) the propriety of venue is essentially irrelevant to the question of how a forum-selection clause
ought to be enforced (understanding that improper venue can lead to a dismissal on that basis as well).
Similarly, the Article takes no issue with the Court’s conclusion that 28 U.S.C. § 1406 and Rule
12(b)(3) were not proper vehicles for enforcing the forum-selection clause at issue in this case, though
not because venue was proper, but rather, as will be shown, because the use of those provisions suffers
from many of the same problems as does § 1404. Finally, the Article does not disagree with the Court’s
judgment or its insinuation that this action should not be litigated in the Western District of Texas; the
disagreement rather is with its means of enforcing the forum-selection clause.

Shannon-66.3.doc (Do Not Delete)

April 2015]

ENFORCING FORUM-SELECTION CLAUSES

3/23/2015 5:08 PM

783

problems relate to the Court’s use of federal transfer of venue statutes
(at least as a starting point) to enforce a forum-selection clause.
Simply as a matter of statutory interpretation, it is unclear why either
§ 1404 or § 1406 should be regarded as having any applicability or even
relevance in this context. Both of these statutes are located in a portion
of the U.S. Code relating to venue,32 and nothing in the text of these
statutes speaks of forum-selection clauses or the enforcement of forumselection clauses.33 The presence or absence of a forum-selection clause
is also not included among the “private” or “public” interest factors
typically used by courts in connection with these statutes to determine
whether an action should be transferred or dismissed.34 This is not
surprising, for as the history of these statutes makes clear, their sole
purpose is to provide for the possibility of a transfer to another federal
court, rather than a dismissal, under circumstances primarily relating to
inconvenience,35 that previously warranted a dismissal under the doctrine of
forum non conveniens or required a dismissal for improper venue.36 The
better reading of these statutes in fact suggests that they are applicable
only in the absence of a forum-selection clause, a contractual agreement
that is seemingly designed to take the issue of venue off the table.
Incidentally—lest there be any confusion on this point—the recent
amendment to § 1404(a) did nothing to alter this interpretation. Pursuant
to the Federal Courts Jurisdiction and Venue Clarification Act of 2011,37
§ 1404(a) now permits a district court to transfer an action not only to
any district “where it might have been brought”—that is, to another
district in which venue and personal jurisdiction would have been

32. See 28 U.S.C. ch. 87 (“District Courts; Venue”) (encompassing §§ 1390 through 1413).
33. Indeed, as the Atlantic Marine Court itself stated in a related context, “[w]hether venue is
‘wrong’ or ‘improper’ depends exclusively on whether the court in which the case is brought satisfies
the requirements of federal venue laws, and those provisions say nothing about a forum-selection
clause.” Atl. Marine, 134 S. Ct. at 577 (emphasis added). Accord id. (“This question—whether venue
is ‘wrong’ or ‘improper’—is generally governed by 28 U.S.C. § 1391 . . . . Whether the parties entered
into a contract containing a forum-selection clause has no bearing on whether a case falls into one of
the categories listed in § 1391(b).”). See also 14D Wright et al., supra note 4, § 3801 (“‘Venue’ refers
to locality, the place where a lawsuit should be heard according to the applicable statutes or rules.”).
34. See supra notes 22–23 and accompanying text (discussing these factors).
35. See Gulf Oil Corp. v. Gilbert, 330 U.S. 501, 507 (1947) (“A plaintiff sometimes is under
temptation to resort to a strategy of forcing the trial at a most inconvenient place for an adversary,
even at some inconvenience to himself.”); 15 Charles Alan Wright et al., Federal Practice and
Procedure § 3841 (3d ed. 2007) (“Section 1404(a) allows the district court to make a particularized
determination, under all of the circumstances of an individual case, on where it can most, or at least
more, conveniently be tried.”).
36. See Atl. Marine, 134 S. Ct. at 580 (“Section 1404(a) is merely a codification of the doctrine of
forum non conveniens for the subset of cases in which the transferee forum is within the federal court
system; in such cases, Congress has replaced the traditional remedy of outright dismissal with transfer.”).
37. Pub. L. No. 112-63, 125 Stat. 763 (2011).
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proper38—but also to any district “to which all parties have consented.”39
The Atlantic Marine Court seemed to suggest that this new “consent”
language refers to (or at least includes) precommencement forumselection clauses.40 But this reading of § 1404(a) is almost certainly
incorrect. Though the legislative history accompanying the 2011 Act
appears to be silent on this issue, the better view is that this statute refers
not to forum-selection clauses, but rather to post-commencement
agreements to transfer venue. For the term “parties” as used in this
statute must refer to the parties to the action, which might well include
persons in addition to those who might be bound by a forum-selection
clause (and who might not have even been known at the time of the
making of that contract). This is also the meaning typically assigned to
the term “parties” in the federal procedural context,41 and it would make
little sense to permit an action to be transferred to another district based
on the “consent” of some of the parties to the action, but not all.
Moreover, § 1404(a) as amended distinguishes between venues in which
the action “might have been brought” and those in which it could not
have been brought but that to which the parties now consent. In a
situation, such as occurred in Atlantic Marine, in which the venue
specified in the forum-selection clause is also a venue in which the action
“might have been brought,” the “consent” provision would seem to be
superfluous. It is also notable that § 1404(a) refers to the district to which
all parties “have” (not had) consented, which points more towards
agreements made post-commencement, rather than at some time in the
past.42 And in Atlantic Marine, the plaintiff (J-Crew), of course, did not

38. See Hoffman v. Blaski, 363 U.S. 335, 343–44 (1960) (interpreting the phrase “where it might
have been brought” in § 1404(a) in this manner).
39. 28 U.S.C. § 1404(a) (2012).
40. See Atl. Marine, 134 S. Ct. at 579 (opining that § 1404(a) “permits transfer to any district
where venue is also proper . . . or to any other district to which the parties have agreed by contract or
stipulation,” and that this statute “therefore provides a mechanism for enforcement of forum-selection
clauses that point to a particular federal district”).
41. See, e.g., Fed. R. Civ. P. 10(a) (“The title of the complaint must name all the parties . . . .”).
42. Cf. Stewart Org., Inc. v. Ricoh Corp., 487 U.S. 22, 34–35 (1988) (Scalia, J., dissenting) (“Although
the language of § 1404(a) provides no clear answer [as to whether forum-selection clauses fall within
its scope], in my view it does provide direction. The provision vests the district courts with authority to
transfer a civil action to another district ‘for the convenience of parties and witnesses, in the interest of
justice.’ This language looks to the present and the future. As the specific reference to convenience of
parties and witnesses suggests, it requires consideration of what is likely to be just in the future, when
the case is tried, in light of things as they now stand. Accordingly, the courts in applying § 1404(a) have
examined a variety of factors, each of which pertains to facts that currently exist or will exist: e.g., the
forum actually chosen by the plaintiff, the current convenience of the parties and witnesses, the
current location of pertinent books and records, similar litigation pending elsewhere, current docket
conditions, and familiarity of the potential court with governing state law. In holding that the validity
between the parties of a forum-selection clause falls within the scope of § 1404(a), the Court inevitably
imports, in my view without adequate textual foundation, a new retrospective element into the court’s
deliberations, requiring examination of what the facts were concerning, among other things, the
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consent to the transfer of the action to the venue specified in the forumselection clause (post-commencement, anyway), but rather opposed
Atlantic Marine’s efforts to do so all the way to the Supreme Court.43
Because § 1404(a) and § 1406(a) were not designed with forumselection clause enforcement in mind, the Atlantic Marine Court’s use of
these statutes for this purpose results in a mode of analysis that can only
be described as contrived. The Court began not with the forum-selection
clause at issue, but rather with a determination of whether venue—
without regard to the forum-selection clause—was proper or improper in
the forum where the action was commenced.44 The Court then modified
the analysis typically used in this context, first by eliminating the
plaintiff’s “venue privilege,”45 and then by reading § 1404(a)’s triggering
condition—“for the convenience of the parties and witnesses”—out of
that provision.46 The Court concluded by acknowledging that § 1404(a)
applies only when the forum-selection clause points to another federal
forum; when it points to a state or foreign court, an entirely different
procedural device—forum non conveniens—is required.47
The anomalous results potentially produced by the Court’s scheme
provide further evidence that these statutes are inapt in this context.
Atlantic Marine, in at least one sense, was a fairly simple case: venue was
proper not only in the district where the action was commenced, but also
in the district specified in the forum-selection clause, meaning that the
latter presumably was a district where the action “might have been
brought” under § 1404(a), and therefore was a potential transferee court.
But other possibilities and combinations are possible. For example, what

bargaining power of the parties and the presence or absence of overreaching at the time the contract
was made.” (original alteration and citation omitted)).
43. See Atl. Marine, 134 S. Ct. at 576.
A leading treatise alternatively (and persuasively) suggests that this amendment to § 1404(a)
was actually made in response to the Supreme Court’s decision in Hoffman v. Blaski. See 17 James
Wm. Moore, Moore’s Federal Practice § 111.12[1][c] (3d ed. 2014) (“Before the statutory change,
courts could not consider the defendant’s consent to the transferee venue because transfer was
authorized only to a court where the action ‘might have been brought.’ In Hoffman v. Blaski, the
Supreme Court ruled that a lack of proper venue in the proposed transferee district precluded
transfer. The court went on to state that transfer was unauthorized on the additional ground that the
transferee court could not have asserted personal jurisdiction over the defendant at the time the action
was initially filed. . . . [L]ower courts were required to follow Hoffman v. Blaski’s rule that the
transferee court must have personal jurisdiction independent of the defendant’s consent, until this rule
was abrogated by the 2011 amendment.”).
44. See Atl. Marine, 134 S. Ct. at 577.
45. See supra note 22 and accompanying text.
46. See supra note 23.
47. See Atl. Marine, 134 S. Ct. at 579–80; see also Ryan T. Holt, Note, A Uniform System for the
Enforceability of Forum Selection Clauses in Federal Courts, 62 Vand. L. Rev. 1913, 1930 (2009) (“If
parties have a general right to select their own forum for litigation ex ante and to have that forum
honored by the court, it seems odd to employ a procedural mechanism that automatically cuts out the
majority of potential forums in the country.”).
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if the forum-selection clause instead had provided that all disputes were
to be litigated in a federal district in which venue, under § 1391, was
improper (and thus is not a district where the action “might have been
brought”)? Absent the “consent” of all the parties—which here seems
unlikely, post-commencement—§ 1404(a) suggests that such an action
could not be transferred. Does this then mean that the forum-selection
clause may not be enforced? Or must a district court resort to the
doctrine of forum non conveniens here also? The answers to these
questions are unclear.48 What if the plaintiff had commenced an action in
the forum specified in the clause, a forum that, under § 1391, was
improper? Section 1406(a) and Rule 12(b)(3) provide that such an action
must be transferred or dismissed, but that cannot be the correct result in
all such cases.49 Admittedly, such anomalies, of themselves, do not
necessarily mean that these statutes are inapplicable or irrelevant in this
context. Poorly drafted statutes are not unknown. But the problems

48. Notice also that these same problems arise when enforcement is sought under § 1406(a),
which uses similar “could have been brought” language.
49. Of course, when a plaintiff commences an action in the forum specified in a valid forumselection clause, a strong argument can be made that the defendant has waived any objection that
might otherwise attach to litigating in that forum, and that such waivers, at least as to things such as
venue, generally will be respected. See, e.g., Leroy v. Great W. United Corp., 443 U.S. 173, 180 (1979)
(“[N]either personal jurisdiction nor venue is fundamentally preliminary in the sense that subjectmatter jurisdiction is, for both are personal privileges of the defendant, rather than absolute strictures
on the court, and both may be waived by the parties.”); 14D Wright et al., supra note 4, § 3801
(“Because venue is for the convenience of litigants it is a personal privilege of the defendants and can
be waived by them.” (footnote omitted)). Thus, when one insists on analyzing forum-selection clause
enforcement by determining first whether venue is proper or improper without regard to that clause,
one is led down a very dubious path.
And the questions do not stop here. Consider, for example, the following summary of the
current state of the law here, again from a leading treatise in this area:
The first question is whether the district court will enforce a forum selection clause when
an action is filed in a district permitted by the clause, but that district is not a proper venue
under the applicable venue statute. Courts generally will enforce the agreement. In the first
place, defendants may waive objection to venue. Second, the Supreme Court has made clear
that it generally will enforce such agreements. Thus, when a defendant moves to dismiss a case
when a plaintiff has invoked a forum selection clause, courts generally will deny the motion.
The second question is whether the district court will enforce the forum selection clause
at the insistence of the defendant when the plaintiff chooses a different, but otherwise
proper, forum under the applicable venue provisions. . . . If an action is brought in a forum
that is proper under the venue stat[utes], but a valid forum selection clause requires that the
action be maintained in another forum, then a party may seek to enforce the clause through
a motion for convenience transfer under 28 U.S.C. § 1404(a). When a party files such a
motion, the district court should transfer the case unless extraordinary circumstances
unrelated to the convenience of the parties clearly disfavor a transfer.
17 Moore, supra note 43, § 110.01[4][b] (footnotes omitted). But why, precisely, should the Court’s
approach differ in these situations? Again, the answer is not entirely clear.
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associated with the use of § 1404(a) and § 1406(a) do seem to point in
that direction, or at least suggest the need for an alternative.50
A related concern pertains to the remedies dictated by the use of
these statutes. Again, according to the Atlantic Marine Court, if venue is
proper, only a transfer to another district is possible,51 whereas if venue is
improper, the district court may transfer or dismiss.52 It is difficult,
though, to see why the nature of the remedy here should turn on the
propriety of venue in the district where the action was commenced. In
particular, it is difficult to see why, when venue is proper, a defendant’s
remedy should be limited to a transfer of venue. This is almost certainly not
the defendant’s preferred remedy—and indeed, in Atlantic Marine, the
defendant initially moved for dismissal.53 Only in the alternative did it
move to transfer the action to the forum specified in the clause.54
Second, irrespective of whether the Atlantic Marine Court’s
approach to enforcing forum-selection clauses is right or wrong as an
interpretative matter, it certainly has resulted in a very complicated
scheme. Following Atlantic Marine, we now have two lines of analysis
for motions to transfer venue under § 1404(a): one for actions that
involve forum-selection clauses, and another for actions that do not.55
But this assumes venue is proper; if it is improper, forum-selection clause
enforcement presumably would be analyzed under § 1406(a) or Rule
12(b)(3), thus similarly necessitating at least two lines of analysis under
one or both of these provisions. On the other hand, if venue is proper,
but the forum-selection clause points to a state or foreign forum, the
clause should be enforced under a modified version of the doctrine of
forum non conveniens—meaning two lines of analysis in that area as
well.56 As Justice Antonin Scalia once quipped, albeit in another context,
50. See David Marcus, The Perils of Contract Procedure: A Revised History of Forum Selection
Clauses in the Federal Courts, 82 Tul. L. Rev. 973, 1033 (2008) (“The migration of contract into
procedure will inevitably require courts to apply existing mechanisms that are ill-suited for the task of
giving appropriate effect to parties’ agreements.”).
51. See 28 U.S.C. § 1404(a) (2012).
52. See § 1406(a).
53. See Atl. Marine Constr. Co. v. U.S. Dist. Court, 134 S. Ct. 568, 576 (2013).
54. See id. It also might be observed that where, under § 1404(a) or § 1406(a), a transfer is
available, the court in which the action was commenced potentially must decide two issues: (1)
whether it should grant the motion, and (2) if so, where the action should be transferred. Though this
mode of analysis might be unavoidable in the venue transfer context, it generally seems preferable to
defer to the forum specified in the clause as to the latter determination.
55. As some have observed, the more “traditional” § 1404 analysis—the starting point of the
Court’s forum-selection clause analysis—is itself something of a mess. See, e.g., David E. Steinberg,
The Motion to Transfer and the Interests of Justice, 66 Notre Dame L. Rev. 443, 462 (1990)
(concluding that the Supreme Court “has failed to provide standards that will result in predictable and
consistent transfer decisions”). Though the propriety of that analysis is beyond the scope of this
Article, its incoherence does not make the analysis here any easier.
56. This expansion in the use of the doctrine of forum non conveniens seems particularly
surprising given the Court’s earlier statement that this doctrine “has continuing application only in
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“Ockham is offended by today’s decision, even if no one else is.”57
Certainly, law can be complicated, and if the proper means of enforcing
such a clause necessitates complexity, its convoluted nature would be
unavoidable (even if unfortunate). Here, though, one gets the sense that
the complexity is largely self-inflicted.
Yet another concern is whether a § 1404/§ 1406/forum non
conveniens-type analysis, even as modified by the Court in Atlantic
Marine, fully captures all of the factors that might be considered
relevant—and fully discards those considered irrelevant—when
determining whether to enforce a forum-selection clause. In theory, a
court could take any one of several approaches, and where it might fall
along this continuum depends in large part on the court’s view of party
preference.58 At one extreme, a court could refuse to enforce them, but
the Court quite clearly has rejected that approach. At the other extreme,
a court could enforce them across the board. Though the Court seems to
have rejected that approach as well, the language used in its opinions on this
subject suggests that its current attitude is something very close to this.59
But to the extent such clauses are not enforceable in all cases, what
are the factors a court should use to make this determination? Though
the Court’s “extraordinary circumstances” standard60 might not provide
a complete answer, its current analysis seems to be limited to the “publicinterest” portion of a traditional venue transfer/forum non conveniens
analysis, which (again) consists primarily of considerations relating to
cases where the alternative forum is abroad.” Am. Dredging Co. v. Miller, 510 U.S. 443, 449 n.2
(1994). Though the Court, in dicta, might have since reopened the door to the use of this doctrine as to
state courts, see Sinochem Int’l Co. v. Malay. Int’l Shipping Corp., 549 U.S. 422, 430 (2007) (opining
that the doctrine of forum non conveniens “perhaps” applies “in rare instances where a state or
territorial court serves litigation convenience best”), the Atlantic Marine Court apparently has taken
the use of this doctrine to a new level. Moreover, the Court’s effort to homogenize the forum-selection
clause enforcement procedure as between venue transfer statutes and the doctrine of forum non
conveniens arguably has resulted in inappropriate changes to the latter. See generally Robin Effron,
Atlantic Marine and the Future of Forum Non Conveniens, 66 Hastings L.J. 693 (2015). Finally, the
Court’s expanded reliance on forum non conveniens assumes that the use of this common-law doctrine
is proper in any context, and arguably, it is not. See Elizabeth T. Lear, Congress, the Federal Courts,
and Forum Non Conveniens: Friction on the Frontier of the Inherent Power, 91 Iowa L. Rev. 1147
(arguing that the doctrine of forum non conveniens is unconstitutional); see also Gulf Oil Corp. v.
Gilbert, 330 U.S. 501, 517 (1947) (Black, J., dissenting) (“Whether the doctrine of forum non
conveniens is good or bad, I should wait for Congress to adopt it.”).
57. Day v. McDonough, 547 U.S. 198, 217 (2006) (Scalia, J., dissenting); see also id. at 216
(criticizing the “novel regime that the Court adopts today, which will apparently require the development of
new rules from scratch”).
58. See generally Scott Dodson, Atlantic Marine and the Future of Party Preference, 66 Hastings
L.J. 675 (2015).
59. See supra note 26 and accompanying text; see also 14D Wright et al., supra note 4, § 3803.1
(“Today, the common understanding is that [forum-selection clauses] are prima facie valid and should
be enforced unless enforcement is shown to be unreasonable under the circumstances of the particular
contract. . . . Generally, a strongly hospitable judicial attitude toward these clauses prevails.”).
60. See Atl. Marine Constr. Co. v. U.S. Dist. Court, 134 S. Ct. 568, 581 (2013).
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court congestion, the local interest in the controversy, and the court’s
familiarity with the relevant substantive law.61 Is this the best we can do?
The answer to this question is beyond the scope of this Article,62 but if
the answer is “no,” then this is further evidence that § 1404(a) and
§ 1406(a) are inapposite in this context.63
Moreover, though the Atlantic Marine Court made some reference
to Supreme Court precedent in this area, it failed to fully reconcile the
approach adopted in this case with that taken in earlier cases. For
example, one of the cases cited by the Court was M/S Bremen v. Zapata
Off-Shore Co.64 In Bremen, the Court stated that a forum-selection
clause generally should be enforced unless the opposing party “could clearly
show that enforcement would be unreasonable or unjust, or that the
clause was invalid for such reasons as fraud or overreaching.”65 And in
Carnival Cruise Lines, Inc. v. Shute, the Court reaffirmed that “a court
concerned with the enforceability of such a clause must begin its analysis
with [Bremen] where this Court held that forum-selection clauses . . . are
‘prima facie valid.’”66 Though Bremen and Carnival Cruise Lines were
admiralty cases, whereas subject-matter jurisdiction in Atlantic Marine
(as well as in Stewart) was based on diversity of citizenship,67 it is not clear
that this is a distinction that should make a difference. One leading
treatise explains:
The procedure required by Stewart for evaluating forum selection
clauses differs sharply from that required in M/S Bremen and Carnival
Cruise. The combined rule of these cases is that a federal court sitting
in admiralty jurisdiction should apply a forum selection clause if it is
“reasonable,” but a federal court sitting in diversity or federal question
jurisdiction should take the clause into account only as one element in
the balancing test required by Section 1404(a), provided only that the

61. See supra note 24 and accompanying text.
62. For a thoughtful starting point, though, see Nw. Nat’l Ins. Co. v. Donovan, 916 F.2d 372, 376–78
(7th Cir. 1990) (Posner, J.) (concluding, on the one hand, that parties acting in contravention of a
forum-selection clause “were compensated in advance for bearing the burden of which they now
complain, and will reap a windfall if they are permitted to repudiate the . . . clause,” but recognizing
that the enforcement of certain clauses “could interfere with the orderly allocation of judicial business
and injure other third-party interests (that is, interests of persons other than the parties to the contract
containing the clause)”). A clause pointing to a foreign court might lead to additional considerations,
such as those relating to due process and the effectiveness of any relief that might be obtained.
63. One might suppose that the Court’s modified § 1404(a) analysis could be modified further,
and that additional factors could be added or subtracted; after all, the Court, perhaps hedging, stated
only that its “public-interest” factors “may include” such considerations. At some point, though, this
(again) suggests the need for an alternative procedure. See Atl. Marine, 134 S. Ct. at 581 n.6.
64. 407 U.S. 1 (1972). See Atl. Marine, 134 S. Ct. at 582.
65. 407 U.S. at 15. The Court further suggested that “[a] contractual choice-of-forum clause
should be held unenforceable if enforcement would contravene a strong public policy of the forum in
which suit is brought” and (perhaps) “if the chosen forum is seriously inconvenient for the trial of the
action.” Id. at 15–16.
66. 499 U.S. 585, 589 (1991) (citation omitted).
67. See Atl. Marine, 134 S. Ct. at 576.
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clause does not mandate a state forum. This distinction in the
procedure followed in admiralty and non-admiralty cases is no doubt
curious, especially given that the rule governing the transfer of venue
in admiralty cases is closely modeled on Section 1404(a), which
controls in diversity and federal question cases. The most likely
explanation for the Supreme Court’s bifurcated approach to forum
selection clause analysis is that the Erie doctrine, which is central to the
reasoning of Stewart, has no application in admiralty law. . . . And yet,
the distinction is even more confusing because the Court in Carnival
Cruise does not highlight the significance of admiralty jurisdiction to its
analysis and the Court never has explained the underlying rationale for
its bifurcated approach.68

A final concern relates to the fact that the Court’s forum-selection
clause enforcement procedure—a procedure that relies heavily on the
use of federal venue transfer statutes—has no applicability in state
courts. It is unclear why the proper procedure for the enforcement of a
forum-selection clause should vary significantly between federal and state
courts; aside from the fact that the latter might not be able to effectuate
an out-of-state transfer, there is no obvious reason why there should be
much of a difference (and of course, to the extent there is a significant
difference, that is one more complicating factor in this area as a whole).
As for the approach proposed by the amicus: Undoubtedly, a
defendant seeking to enforce a forum-selection clause could plead some
sort of defense relating to the impropriety of the forum selected by the
plaintiff. But assuming that there is a coherent distinction between the
validity of a forum-selection clause and its enforcement,69 Rule 12(b)(6)
does not seem to provide the appropriate procedure for accomplishing the
latter. Rule 12(b)(6) appears to be reserved for the enforcement of meritsbased defenses, as opposed to what might be termed (for lack of a better
word) procedural defenses, such as the enforcement of a forum-selection
clause, an issue that has nothing to do with the merits, but rather relates
only to the identity of the proper forum.70 It was for this reason, at least
68. 14D Wright et al., supra note 4, § 3803.1 (footnotes omitted); see also id. (“Not surprisingly,
given this confusion surrounding forum-selection clause analysis, many lower federal courts have
failed to distinguish between the approach taken in Carnival Cruise and that taken in Stewart. There
thus has developed a general jurisprudence that has not been responsive to the differences between
these approaches.”).
69. Though this Article only assumes this to be true, the Atlantic Marine Court seemed to agree.
See Atl. Marine, 134 S. Ct. at 576, 581 n.5 (observing that “there was no dispute that the forumselection clause was valid,” and that its analysis “presupposes a contractually valid forum-selection
clause”); see also Clermont, supra note 2, at 646–50 (similarly discussing this distinction).
70. See, e.g., Albany Ins. Co. v. Almacenadora Somex, S.A., 5 F.3d 907, 909 n.3 (5th Cir. 1993)
(“Although [Defendant] called it a motion for summary judgment, the motion did not raise an
objection or defense to the merits of [Plaintiff’s] complaint, nor did it attack the factual basis of the
allegations contained therein. Moreover, at the time of its motion, [Defendant] had no defensive
pleading on file. The motion simply requested the court to enforce the forum clauses and dismiss [Plaintiff’s]
suit without prejudice to refile in Mexico.”). See also Leandra Lederman, Note, Viva Zapata!: Toward
a Rational System of Forum-Selection Clause Enforcement in Diversity Cases, 66 N.Y.U. L. Rev. 422,
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in part, that the Court considered the issue in Atlantic Marine to be one
of federal (rather than state) law,71 a conclusion that seemingly would be
true regardless of the nature of the Court’s enforcement mechanism.72 It
is also for this reason, at least in part, that the Court did not consider this
issue to be one for the jury,73 and why the dismissal of an action on this
ground should not preclude the recommencement of the same action in a
more appropriate court (which in this context, of course, is the entire
point).74
Though it might be possible that such a clause could alternatively be
“enforced” by a counterclaim for breach of contract, it does not appear
that such a procedure would result in any sort of advantage. For one
thing, though such a defendant might be able to obtain money damages
or even specific performance (presumably meaning commencement of

446 (1991) (concluding that neither Rule 12(b)(6) nor Rule 56 should be used to enforce a forumselection cause because such a clause “is unrelated to the merits of the underlying dispute”).
71. See Atl. Marine, 134 S. Ct. at 579 (concluding that “‘federal law . . . governs the District
Court’s decision whether to give effect to the parties’ forum-selection clause’”) (quoting Stewart Org.,
Inc. v. Ricoh Corp., 487 U.S. 22, 32 (1988))).
72. See 17 Moore, supra note 43, § 111.04[2][b] (“Courts addressing motions to dismiss based on
forum selection clauses have generally applied federal law . . . as opposed to state law, to the question
of the enforceability of the clause.”); Clermont, supra note 2, at 650 (concluding that courts should
apply lex fori as to the enforceability of forum-selection clauses, which in federal courts will generally
lead to the application of federal law).
73. See supra note 30. Cf. Arbaugh v. Y & H Corp., 546 U.S. 500, 514 (2006) (recognizing that “if
subject-matter jurisdiction turns on contested facts, the trial judge may be authorized to review the
evidence and resolve the dispute on her own,” but that “[i]f satisfaction of an essential element of a
claim for relief is at issue . . . the jury is the proper trier of contested facts” (citations omitted)).
74. By implication, the Court’s decision in Atlantic Marine leaves little doubt in this regard. Cf.
Sinochem Int’l Co. v. Malay. Int’l Shipping Corp., 549 U.S. 422, 432–33 (2007) (describing forum non
conveniens as a “non-merits ground for dismissal” that “does not entail any assumption by the court of
substantive law-declaring power,” but rather “denies audience to a case on the merits,” and “is a
determination that the merits should be adjudicated elsewhere” (internal quotation marks omitted)).
For more on the distinctions between dispositive motions going to the merits (such as a motion under
Rule 12(b)(6)) and more “procedural”-type dismissals, see Bradley Scott Shannon, Action Is an
Action Is an Action Is an Action, 77 Wash. L. Rev. 65, 125–35 (2002).
Incidentally, the foregoing discussion as to the enforcement of a forum-selection clause does not
necessarily mean that Rule 12(b)(6) would be inapposite with respect to the question of the validity of
such a clause, or that state (or even foreign) law would not be implicated in making that
determination. See Clermont, supra note 2, at 652–54. But those issues likewise are beyond the scope
of this Article. It does seem, though, the Court’s oblique suggestion to the contrary notwithstanding,
that the correct procedure as to clause validity should not depend upon the manner in which the clause
is enforced. See Atl. Marine, 134 S. Ct. at 580 n.4 (“We observe, moreover, that a motion under Rule
12(b)(6), unlike a motion under § 1404(a) or the forum non conveniens doctrine, may lead to a jury
trial on venue if issues of material fact relating to the validity of the forum-selection clause arise.”). It
also seems that when one speaks of validity in this context, one must be referring to what might be
termed contractual validity—that is, things that go to the validity of the contract as a whole—for if
validity is thought to include anything that might prevent the enforceability of the clause, the one
would essentially swallow the other. In other words, when ascertaining the limits of validity, the focus
seemingly should be on the nature of the subject being regulated, and not on the supposed “intent” of
the law in question.
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the action in the forum specified in the clause), what the defendant
probably prefers by way of remedy is a dismissal, not a trial, and sooner,
rather than later.75 But it also seems that in order to prevail on such a
counterclaim, the defendant would have to prove, inter alia, that the
clause was valid and enforceable—which is all that would have to be
proved in order to prevail on the defense.

III. A Better Way: A Motion to Dismiss for
Enforcement of the Forum-Selection Clause
As the foregoing discussion suggests, neither the Court’s § 1404/§ 1406/
Rule 12(b)(3)/forum non conveniens approach, nor a Rule 12(b)(6)-type
approach, is the best means of enforcing a forum-selection clause. Though
federal venue transfer statutes and the doctrine of forum non conveniens,
like forum-selection clauses, are in some sense concerned with the
location of trial, there is almost nothing else about the former that bears
any relationship to the latter. Likewise, Rule 12(b)(6), which is concerned
with the merits, is largely inapposite in this context. Fortunately, the
Atlantic Marine Court did not foreclose the possibility of an
alternative.76 So, to return to the initial question: how should a forumselection clause be enforced?
Once validity is established, a forum-selection clause should be
enforced simply by a motion to dismiss for enforcement of the clause.77
Whether initially presented as a defense in the answer78 or by way of a
preanswer motion,79 a motion to enforce the clause would allow this issue

75. Cf. Lauro Lines s.r.l. v. Chasser, 490 U.S. 495, 502–03 (Scalia, J., concurring) (observing that
“the ‘right not to be sued elsewhere than in Naples’ is not fully vindicated—indeed, to be utterly frank,
is positively destroyed—by permitting the trial to occur [elsewhere] and reversing its outcome”).
76. See, e.g., Atl. Marine, 134 S. Ct. 568 at 575 (holding that when venue is otherwise proper, “a
forum-selection clause may be enforced by a motion to transfer under § 1404(a)” (emphasis added));
id. at 580 (similarly holding only “that § 1404(a) and the forum non conveniens doctrine provide
appropriate enforcement mechanisms” (emphasis added)).
77. Such a motion, incidentally, is not without some precedent (at least in the nontechnical sense
of that word). For example, in Lauro Lines s.r.l. v. Chasser, the defendant appealed the denial of its
motion to dismiss “on the basis of a contractual forum-selection clause,” 490 U.S. at 496, and there is
no indication in the Court’s opinion that anyone took issue with this characterization; see also
Lederman, supra note 70, at 466 (discussing the possibility of a “‘motion to dismiss based on the
forum-selection clause’ without citing a particular statute or rule,” though not as an exclusive means of
enforcement). Cf. Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b) (suggesting that dismissal is the preferred procedural vehicle
(if not also the preferred remedy) for addressing procedural deficiencies).
78. See Fed. R. Civ. P. 8(b)(1)(A) (requiring a defendant to “state in short and plain terms its
defenses to each claim asserted against it”).
79. See 5B Charles Alan Wright & Arthur R. Miller, Federal Practice and Procedure
§ 1349 (3d. ed. 2004) (“Although the seven motions specifically enumerated in Rule 12(b) theoretically
are the only motions that can be made prior to service of the responsive pleading, in reality the
preliminary-motion practice in federal courts has a much broader compass.”).
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to be resolved at the earliest possible time.80 More importantly, such a
motion would solve virtually all of the problems associated with the
Court’s current scheme. In particular, the utilization of a motion to
dismiss for enforcement of a forum-selection clause would obviate the
need for a modified § 1404/§ 1406 analysis, thus returning those statutes
to their original (and sole) purpose: to permit the transfer of venue to
another court within the federal district court system. It also would allow
for the creation of a mode of analysis tailored specifically to the concerns
associated with enforcement of such clauses—that is, one that more
effectively strikes the appropriate balance of competing policy
considerations in this context.
The approach proposed in this Article would result in “horizontal”
uniformity across all federal cases, regardless of the basis for subjectmatter jurisdiction, the propriety of venue, and whether the clause in
question points to a federal or nonfederal forum. It also holds the
promise of achieving “vertical” uniformity between the procedure
adopted in federal courts and that likely to be used in state courts.
As some have observed, a motion to dismiss for enforcement of the
forum-selection clause enforcement is not specifically mentioned in the
Rules, nor is it provided for by federal statute. But the Rules expressly
recognize that not all defenses have been named therein,81 and in any
event, the same could be said of a dismissal under the doctrine of forum
non conveniens, a procedure the Court seems to wholeheartedly embrace.
And though the remedy here might be limited to a dismissal—whereas
under the current scheme a transfer might be possible, at least within the
federal system—a plaintiff in this situation, having acted in apparent
contravention of the clause, would seem to have little room for complaint.82

80. See id. (“These seven defenses are permitted to be asserted prior to service of the responsive
pleading because they present preliminary or threshold matters that normally should be adjudicated early
in the action. That is because, if successful, a Rule 12(b) challenge usually will dispose of the pending case,
although the dismissal generally is not on the merits and does not prevent amendment of the complaint or
reassertion of the claim in the same or a different court if the defect can be cured. Except for grants of
motions under subdivision (b)(6) given certain circumstance, a successful Rule 12(b) challenge also does
not prohibit the plaintiff’s institution of a new action in another court. Thus, the rationale underlying
recognition of these seven exceptions to the basic policy of the federal rules against dilatory or
preliminary motions is that motions on the grounds enumerated in Rule 12(b) are likely to produce an
overall savings in time and resources as well as avoid delay in the disposition of cases, thereby benefitting
both the parties and the courts.” (footnotes omitted)). Precisely the same reasoning applies here.
81. See, e.g., Fed. R. Civ. P. 8(c)(1) (providing that the universe of affirmative defenses only
“includ[es]” those listed in that rule).
82. See Atl. Marine Constr. Co. v. U.S. Dist. Court, 134 S. Ct. 568, 583 n.8 (2013) (“[W]hen the plaintiff
has violated a contractual obligation by filing suit in a forum other than the one specified in a valid forumselection clause . . . dismissal would work no injustice on the plaintiff.”). This is not to say that a transfer here
also might be possible; though also not expressly authorized by Rule or statute, such a transfer would be no
more “lawless” than the Court’s current use of forum non conveniens, and might well be more just.

Shannon-66.3.doc (Do Not Delete)

794

3/23/2015 5:08 PM

HASTINGS LAW JOURNAL

***

[Vol. 66:777

